Abstract: Systemic banking crises often continue into recessions with large output losses. In this paper we ask whether the way governments intervene in the financial sector has an impact on the economy's subsequent performance. Our theoretical analysis focuses on bank incentives to manage bad loans. We show that interventions involving bank recapitalizations provide banks with incentives to restructure bad loans and free up resources for new economic activity. When the fundamental problem is undercapitalization of the banking sector, other interventions, such as guarantees on bank liabilities and liquidity support, lead banks to roll over bad loans, tying up resources in distressed firms: they become zombie banks and a drag on economic recovery.
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Introduction
As early as 2009, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) pointed out that "recessions surrounding financial crises are usually long compared to normal recessions". Their research highlighted surprisingly large declines in output, slow recoveries and large and persistent negative effects on unemployment, public debt and fiscal deficits in the aftermath of banking crises. The subsequent experiences in the United States and particularly in Western Europe seem to lend further support to their findings. Therefore it is no surprise that governments often intervene during financial crises not just to preserve the key functions of the financial system, but often also to mitigate or reverse their macroeconomic impact. But does it matter how they intervene for their chances of macroeconomic success? In Europe distressed banks and fiscally strapped governments continue to hold each other hostage, while financial recovery and banking sector independence from public support has been achieved much more quickly in the US than in Europe. In the light of this experience it is natural to ask whether the way governments intervene in the financial sector has an impact on the economy's subsequent performance. In this paper we begin to answer that question: is the speed of recovery after a financial crisis dependent on the mode of intervention the government chooses in response to that crisis?
The existing literature has documented that intervention measures have high fiscal costs (Honohan and Klingebiel 2003) . Whether the measures are effective in achieving their macroeconomic objectives is less clear. Claessens et al. (2005) find that fiscal costs of banking crises depend on the quality of institutions, which also affects the output losses of crises, but they do not discuss the nature of the interventions taken. Laeven and Valencia (2011) provide suggestive microeconomic evidence that the mode of intervention does matter: they show that in times of banking crises firms more dependent on external finance grow faster when bank recapitalizations are done. We investigate how effective intervention measures are from a macro perspective: how do they affect recession duration? We find that bank recapitalizations significantly reduce recession duration as do generic low interest rate policies. We find little or no support for the impact of bank specific guarantees or liquidity support on the expected recession duration.
In the theoretical analysis that provides the framework for our subsequent empirical analysis, we focus on a key difference between bank recapitalizations and the other bank interventions mentioned, their differential impact on bank incentives for managing bad loans. Financial crises leave distressed banks with unexpectedly low capital ratios. Measures that fail to address the undercapitalization of banks keep incentives in place (or even strengthen them) for these banks to just roll over bad loans and shift risks to depositors. Guarantees make depositors indifferent to the risks that are shifted their way increasing rather than reducing risk shifting and roll over incentives. In that way zombie banks, banks that do not enforce discipline on distressed borrowers, form a drag on economic recovery. On the contrary, interventions that restore the capitalization of distressed banks provide them with incentives to restructure bad loans and free up resources for new economic activities.
We then analyze 68 systemic banking crises from the period 1980-2013, of which 28 are part of the recent global financial crisis using a discrete duration model on a panel dataset to estimate the effect of intervention on the probability of recovery from recession. Our approach enables us to take into account that intervention is endogenous to crisis severity. Governments are more likely to intervene in severe than in mild crises. We think about crisis severity as of a measure of the scale of problems in the banking sector, which would determine recession duration if there was no intervention. As such, crisis severity is not observable. Using a 4 instrument for policy choice. Their estimates show that fiscally costly policies are related to higher output losses and longer crisis duration. Kane and Klingebiel (2004) suggest that governments are too eager to use containment policies, particularly guarantees on bank liabilities and liquidity support, in the first phase of crisis.
The endogeneity of macro-policies problem can sometimes be circumvented by switching to microdata. Kroszner et al. (2007) and Dell 'Ariccia et al. (2008) investigate the growth of firms with higher dependence on external finance and find that such firms grow relatively slower in times of banking crises. Using the same approach, Laeven and Valencia (2011) find that bank restructuring measures have a positive effect on growth of financially dependent firms. Laeven and Valencia (2012b) show that blanket guarantees and bank restructuring are to a degree substitutes for subsequent liquidity support.
We use macrodata but because of the weak instruments problem plaguing 2SLS approaches, we use an alternative approach that enables us to estimate the effectiveness of different policies undistorted by any simultaneous but reverse dependence of policy choice on crisis severity. We capture crisis severity by including a recession specific fixed effect in our panel data setup. We use a grouped duration model with a specification similar to Mundlak (1978) , and allow for correlation between crisis severity as measured by the FE constants and the choice of intervention variables. Since we have a panel dataset about intervention measures in each quarter of recessions, this approach makes it possible to estimate the effect of policies on the probability of recovery that is independent of unobserved crisis severity.
Furthermore, we differentiate between bank restructuring, which improves banks' risk taking incentives, and other policies that only prevent bank failures. Improving bank incentives to manage loans is crucial. Japanese experience (Peek and Rosengren 2005; Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap 2008; Watanabe 2010) shows that poorly capitalized banks tend to extend loans to insolvent firms. Because the inefficient firms then do not exit their industries, more productive firms do not prosper, or may delay entry. This can lead to a long stagnation. An example of successful restructuring where banks were incentivized to become agents of change in loss-making state owned enterprises is Poland ( Van Wijnbergen 1997) . Banks were recapitalized and prudential regulation was gradually put in place. Many banks negotiated a debt to equity conversion with struggling firms. The alternative option for insolvent firms to be transferred to a state agency was made unattractive both for banks and firm insiders. The restructuring program worked out well. The ultimate privatization proceeds from the sale of banks and restructured firms, and bank capitalization ratios at the end of restructuring, far exceeded initial expectations. Calomiris et al. (2013) find evidence that bank recapitalizations increase lending. They investigate two support programs of Reconstruction Finance Corporation in Michigan during the Great Depression. At first banks were offered subordinated loans, which did not significantly reduce the probability of failure. After the passage of Emergency Banking Relief Act in March 1933 the type of support changed. Banks that were distressed but not deeply insolvent received injections of preferred stock. This has significantly increased their probability of survival and resulted in higher loan growth.
Secondly, our paper relates to theoretical literature on intervention in the presence of risk shifting or adverse selection in banking. In Diamond and Rajan (2011) banks with the greatest risk of becoming illiquid in future choose not to sell illiquid assets early, which would insure their survival but hold on to illiquid assets, gambling that the liquidity shock will not occur. Liquid buyers hoard liquidity in expectation of fire sales that take place when many illiquid banks need to sell their assets to repay their liabilities. Philippon and Schnabl (2012) 5 analyze optimal intervention when banks underinvest because of debt overhang. The government cannot observe the value of banks' existing long term assets and new investment opportunities. The optimal form of intervention is bank recapitalization, any debt like instrument would only add to the overhang. To minimize costs of the program the equity injection should be in the form of preferred stock with warrants to make the offer unattractive for banks that would anyhow invest on their own. In contrast, Philippon and Skreta (2012) find that direct lending in the form of liquidity support or guarantees on bank liabilities is the optimal form of intervention when there is adverse selection in bank debt markets. One of their main assumptions is that banks can only raise debt by pledging the combined income from existing assets and new investments. Because investors cannot discriminate between banks based on the quality of their existing assets, banks with high value of legacy assets prefer to pass up positive NPV investment opportunities over paying high interest rates on their debt. In a similar setting with adverse selection Tirole (2011) reaches another conclusion: the optimal form of intervention is asset purchases. This conclusion critically depends on the assumption that only revenues generated by new projects are pledgeable, and only partially so for standard agency reasons, so Banks can only finance the new investment if they sell existing assets.
A common feature of the theoretical papers discussed so far is that adverse selection rather than moral hazard is the key asymmetric information problem. Of course adverse selection is a major problem facing regulators having to intervene in notoriously opaque banks where the regulator cannot easily identify weak banks, and especially so when banks' participation in intervention programs is voluntary. Yet we want to focus on the relatively neglected moral hazard problem. For sharpness of results we assume the absence of any adverse selection problem by looking at a single bank facing the choice between two projects with different risk and return characteristics while asset allocation is not observable for creditors of the bank. The theoretical part of our paper is perhaps most closely related to a very early contribution to the literature on bank intervention, Berglof and Roland (1995) . Their focus is entirely different from ours: the key issue in Berglof and Roland (1995) is the incentive banks have to game the regulator: they are interested in why so called soft budget constraints emerge.
In our set up, we assume that regulators can fully commit to the intervention method and subsidy amount (if any) chosen. We focus on the impact of low capitalization and of different intervention approaches on bank incentives for managing existing assets: the bad loan problem and the macro consequences of so called zombie banks.
Model
The model is mostly intended to generate some insights to guide the empirical analysis. A common form of risk shifting in banking crises is holding on to bad loans instead of liquidating them. A bad loan is a highly risky project with an expected payoff lower than its liquidation value. Yet, it is attractive for a weakly capitalized bank: due to limited liability the bank's shareholders capture the upside if the bad loans repays but shift the risk of losses to debtholders. On the aggregate level renewing bad loans results in lower output because inefficient firms are funded instead of productive new or expanding firms. In stable times, depositors correctly predict the proportion of bad loans that banks will realize. In equilibrium bank leverage is then such that banks have an incentive to liquidate bad loans. But in a banking crisis the ratio of bad loans turns out to be unexpectedly high.
Banks that have been hit no longer have an incentive to liquidate bad loans. If depositors expect a bank to be 6 insolvent in the final period, they withdraw early causing the liquidation of the bank. If the bank is liquidated, there are efficiency losses as together with bad also good loans are liquidated. The regulator can improve welfare if it prevents bank failures to limit the loss of welfare from liquidating good loans and restores incentives of banks to liquidate bad loans. Recapitalizing banks before they make a decision about bad loans fulfills both objectives. Providing liquidity support or guaranteeing bank liabilities, however, only prevents bank failures but does not change their incentives when managing bad loans. The model is setup to demonstrate how bank recapitalization improve incentives of a zombie bank and is not intended to compare the recapitalizations with liquidity support and guarantees on bank liabilities in general. In other settings, for example with sunspot runs or contagion, guarantees and liquidity support could be desirable.
Timeline of events
There are two time periods. The first one lasts from 
Depositors
Depositors are risk neutral and in expectation require a gross return equal to the risk free rate, which is normalized to 1. At 0 t  the bank raises 1 k  of deposits, for which it promises to repay D at 2 t  or D at 1 t  if depositors withdraw early. If they withdraw at 1 t  , the bank tries to raise new debt in the amount of D to repay the existing depositors. In case it cannot repay the promised amount, the depositors get all cash flows the bank can collect. If the bank is insolvent at 1 t  the depositors get  since the bank has to liquidate its entire loan portfolio. If the bank is insolvent at 2 t  , which can occur when bad loans did not perform well, the
Bank
The bank pursues the interests of its shareholders. It is assumed that an incentive structure is in place that insures that the interests of bank managers do not diverge from those of bank shareholders. At 0 t  bank shareholders pay in k of equity, on which they require an expected return strictly larger than the risk free rate.
Assuming a premium on bank equity is consistent with the existing literature (Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz 2000; Repullo 2004; Dell'Ariccia and Marquez 2006; Allen, Carletti, and Marquez 2009) 
Bad loans
Liquidating bad loans represents the use of the material adverse change clause, which gives a bank the right to call a loan when the probability of repayment deteriorates significantly. An alternative interpretation is that firms use the loans to fund projects with duration longer than the maturity of loans. Such loans need to be rolled over before the project is completed. Liquidation parameter  is the price at which the assets of firms with bad loans can be sold to outside investors or can alternatively be interpreted as restructuring of bad loans where the bank immediately writes off 1   of the loan principal to increase the probability of repayment. It is socially optimal to liquidate bad loans. Leaving them as they are is risky and has a lower expected payoff than the payoff from liquidation (and new lending), which is certain. 4
For simplicity it is assumed that the bank extracts all value from the firms to which it lends. The total amount collected from lending is then equal to the aggregate output. Despite the liquidation of bad loans being socially optimal, the bank may choose to roll them over if bank shareholders do not fully internalize the losses when bad loans fail. The bank chooses to liquidate bad loans if liquidation and subsequent lending to new firms brings a 8 higher expected payoff to bank shareholders than does rolling over of bad loans. This is the case if (with roll over R being the outcome of rolled-over bad loans):
Computing the expected payoffs gives the liquidation incentive constraint: 5
If the liquidation incentive constraint (3) is not satisfied, the bank chooses to roll over bad loans.
Equilibrium in stable times
The lending rate R , the proportion of bad loans q , the liquidation value  and the probability that bad loans repay p are public knowledge at 0 t  . The analysis focuses on the case where parameter values are such that banking is only viable if bad loans are liquidated in stable times. We therefore assume that if the bank holds on to bad loans the total expected return from lending is less than 1:
Thus depositors and bank shareholders can both earn at least the risk free rate only if bad loans are liquidated.
Therefore in equilibrium bad loans have to be liquidated. If bad loans are liquidated, the loan repayments at 2 t  are certain. Hence, with the risk free rate being equal to 1, the promised repayment to depositors is equal to their initial investment
To insure that bad loans are liquidated, the incentive constraint (3) has to be satisfied. It can be expressed as a constraint on the bank capital ratio k .
The only way for the bank to commit to liquidate bad loans is to have a sufficiently high capital ratio. Since bank shareholders require a return strictly larger than the risk free rate, they have an incentive to increase bank leverage as much as possible, so in equilibrium the incentive constraint is binding. The required capital ratio is increasing in the proportion of bad loans q and decreasing in the liquidation value  .
Banking crisis
Our focus is on ex-post intervention so we model a banking crisis as a zero-probability event as in Allen and Gale (2000) . A banking crisis differs from stable times in that the proportion of bad loans turns out to be unexpectedly high. Neither the bank nor the depositors expect a shock to the amount of bad loans, so at 0 t  their behavior is exactly the same as in stable times. But at 1 t  the bank (and the regulator) observe that the proportion of bad loans is q   , with 0   being the shock. It still is socially optimal to liquidate bad loans and lend to new firms. But the incentive constraint is no longer satisfied for the new, higher proportion of bad loans.
The new capital ratio ' k that would satisfy the incentive constraint given the higher proportion of bad loans, is larger than the existing capital ratio k :
Depositors recognize that the bank has been hit but do not observe the size of the shock. Total welfare is defined as the sum of repayments to depositors, bank shareholders and the losses or gains realized by the regulator. In the absence of intervention, the entire bank is liquidated. The loans are then sold to outside investors. Depositors place the proceeds into riskless government securities. Total welfare is then equal to  . This scenario implies efficiency losses because good loans are liquidated at a loss and because the proceeds from liquidation of loans are not lent on to new firms as the bank has gone out of business. Consider next two types of intervention, the first group directed at providing access to debt finance, and the second group focusing on recapitalization.
Deposit insurance, blanket guarantees and liquidity support
These measures prevent bank failures as the bank is able to obtain debt financing despite being insolvent.
Because the incentive constraint is still not satisfied, the bank does not liquidate bad loans and gambles that they will succeed. Under deposit insurance or blanket guarantees on bank liabilities, the investors are willing to lend to the bank at the risk free rate because the regulator covers the difference between the value of bank assets
and the outstanding debt D in case bad loans fail. The expected loss of the regulator is
. By providing liquidity support the regulator effectively substitutes all of the bank's existing debt. The expected repayment of the bank is
. The expected loss to the regulator is exactly the same as under deposit insurance. Providing liquidity support or guaranteeing bank liabilities is a better outcome than the failure of the bank if the total expected repayment of the good loans and the bad loans that are rolled over is larger than the liquidation value of the entire bank, which is the case if:
If the amount of bad loans q   is too high (the shock too large), condition (7) is not satisfied and then guarantees on bank liabilities and liquidity support are worse than letting the bank fail at 1 t  .
Bank recapitalization
Bank shareholders do not have an incentive to recapitalize the bank at 1 t  after it has been hit by a shock; recapitalization would only benefit the depositors. The regulator, however, can improve total welfare by recapitalizing the bank before the bank makes the decision about the bad loans. If the regulator injects g of equity into the bank, the incentive constraint is again satisfied if g satisfies:
The amount of recapitalization necessary is thus at least
. It is used to repay part of the existing deposits. Deposits in the second period are then only 1 k g   . When the incentives for liquidating bad loans are restored, the value of bank assets at  2 t In order for the recapitalization to be effective, three conditions need to be satisfied. First, the recapitalization has to be done before the bank makes the decision about bad loans. If it is done after the bank has already rolled over the bad loans, it has no beneficiary effect on incentives: ex post recapitalization only covers the losses from failed bad loans. Second, the recapitalization needs to be large enough. We assume that the regulator cannot take over the bank and thus cannot directly instruct the manager to liquidate bad loans.
Therefore the recapitalization has to be high enough so that with k g  of equity, liquidation of bad loans becomes in the interest of bank shareholders. Third, there should be a ban on dividend payouts. If existing bank
shareholders could decide what to do with recapitalization funds they would prefer an immediate pay out and a continued gamble with the bad loans. To be successful, the recapitalization has to reduce leverage enough to shift incentives, so to be effective it should be accompanied by a ban on dividend payments.
Empirical methodology
Our dataset about systemic banking crises is a panel where index i denotes a banking crisis and t refers to a particular quarter of a recession. For each crisis i the sample includes all time periods when the country was in a recession and the period when it recovered. The time index is 0 t  in the first recession quarter and In regressions we estimate the effect of intervention on the probability of recovery, which is in the context of a duration model also called the hazard rate   
Error term i v is assumed to be normally distributed,  is a vector of coefficients describing the relationship to average intervention and  is a constant. This specification can capture correlation between severity and intervention when a particular type of intervention is more likely to be used in severe than in mild crisis, when the quantity of intervention depends on the severity or when the timing of intervention depends on the severity.
In all these cases the average value of intervention in a crisis is informative about crisis severity. Our identification is based on the part of variation in intervention that is not correlated to i c , thus the variation in intervention over time within a recession. The assumption we make is that intervention is correlated to the component of crisis severity that is common to multiple quarters of a banking crisis (such as the undercapitalization of banks due to a shock to their asset values at the beginning of the crisis) and that it is not driven by variation of crisis severity over time.
We use the approach proposed by Mundlak (1978) to incorporate this form of crisis severity into the estimation equation. First we restate equation (9) using it y as an indicator of the latent probability of recovery 
Then we combine it with equation (10), which describes the relationship between policies and crisis severity to obtain the estimation equation:
The constant  from equation (10) drops out as a constant is already included in  t for which we use a cubic
t . Specification (12) can be estimated with nonlinear methods such as 12 complementary log-log or logit with random effects. The vector of coefficients  describes the effect of policies on recession duration. This specification also allows us to test whether correlation between explanatory variables and unobserved heterogeneity is in fact an issue. If the estimate of the coefficient vector  in (12) is not significant, the correlation between explanatory variables is not problematic and a specification without i x as a regressor can be estimated.
Computing the expected recession duration from predicted probabilities of recovery Based on the estimated parameters from equation (12) we can calculate predicted probabilities of recovery, which we then use to obtain expected recession durations. Bellow we provide equations for predicted probabilities for three estimation models that differ in terms of distributional assumption: the complementary log-log model, the logit model and the linear probability model. A desirable characteristic of the complementary log-log model is that it assumes that the underlying process (recession) is continuous but can only be observed at discrete points in time, while the logit and the linear probability model require the assumption that the duration process is discrete. An additional disadvantage of the linear probability model is that the predicted probabilities can lie outside the     0,1 range. For those reasons we use the complementary log-log specification as our basic
The predicted probability of recovery in period t conditional on the recession not having ended in any of the previous quarters and conditional on it x and i c is given by the following equations for the complementary log-log (13), the logit (14) and the linear probability (15) model respectively:
These probabilities are from here on referred to as conditional probabilities of recovery. In contrast, the term unconditional probability of recovery is used for the predicted probability of recovery that is conditioned only on the values of explanatory variables until then   1 ,..., i t X and i c but not on the recession not having ended before.
The unconditional probability of recovery is the product of the probability of recovery conditional on recession lasting until t and the unconditional probability that the recession has not ended in the previous quarter.
The unconditional probability that the recession has not ended in the previous quarter can be expressed as the corresponding conditional probability of that quarter (conditional on the recession not having ended the quarter before) and the unconditional probability of no recovery a quarter before. This procedure can be repeated all the way back to the first quarter when the conditional probability of recovery is equal to the unconditional 13 probability as there is no preceding quarter. This gives an expression for the unconditional probability of recovery in quarter t as a product of conditional probabilities of no recovery in all previous quarters.
The expected recession duration     i E T is the product of the predicted unconditional probabilities of recovery in any period and their respective durations, which range from
The limit MAX t is set at a value where the numerically computed probability of recession lasting until then is equal to zero.
Data
The dataset covers 68 systemic banking crises from the period 1980-2013, of which 40 are from the period before 2007 and 28 belong to the recent global financial crisis. For each banking crisis the panel includes the quarters in which a country was in a recession, and the quarter when it recovered. 9 We start with the list of 65 of systemic banking crises described by Laeven and Valencia (2012b) . They consider a banking crisis to be systemic if two conditions are met. Firstly, there is major distress in the banking system such as bank runs, large losses of bank capital and bank liquidations. Secondly, there need to be significant policy interventions in response to the problems in the banking sector. This condition is met if at least 3 of the following measures were used:
-extensive liquidity support (claims of the central bank on deposit money banks larger than 5 percent of deposits and liabilities to nonresidents);
-gross bank restructuring costs at least 3 percent of GDP; -significant bank nationalizations; -significant guarantees on bank liabilities;
-asset purchases amounting to at least 5 percent of GDP;
-deposit freezes or bank holidays.
When both conditions are met a crisis is considered systemic. If just 2 types of measures from the list above were used, Laeven and Valencia (2012b) report it as a borderline case. All crises in the 1980-2006 period listed in their dataset were systemic according to the above definition. In the recent global financial crisis 17 countries were classified as having a systemic banking crisis and 8 as borderline cases. The starting date of a banking crisis is the quarter in which major distress in the banking sector was observed. The date when a crisis becomes systemic is the quarter when the above conditions are fulfilled. CRISIS START is the date when major distress in the banking sector was observed. SYSTEMIC CRISIS DATE is the date when the conditions for a banking crisis to be classified as systemic were met. RECESSION DURATION is in quarters. DURATION OF EXISTING RECESSION tells how long a recession has already been ongoing at the time of the banking crisis start. BANK RESTRUCTURING DATE is the time when the main part of bank recapitalizations has been completed. RECAP. END OF RECESSION is the cumulative amount of bank recapitalizations at the end of the recession. RECAP. END OF CRISIS is the total amount of bank recapitalizations in a banking crisis (it includes also bank recapitalizations done after the recession has already ended). The recapitalization amounts are expressed in percent of total banking assets.
Using these criteria, we add 3 more crisis to Table 2 . Some banking crises were not followed by a recession. These crises are 15 included in the tables although they cannot be analyzed with recession duration models. In total there are 13 such crises, 11 in the period before 2007 and 2 after. Next we describe the variables used in the regression analysis. For explanations of the different column headings see Table 1 .
The Recession indicator
The recession indicator is the dependent variable in the duration models. It is equal to 0 if a country is in a recession in a given quarter and equal to 1 if it has just recovered from it. For countries that are not in a recession at the time of the banking crisis start, the start of the recession is defined as the first quarter with negative GDP growth after the start of the banking crisis. This quarter needs to be either part of a sequence of at least two consecutive negative growth quarters or a sequence of positive and negative quarters where a positive quarter is always preceded and succeeded by a negative quarter and there are at least two consecutive negative quarters in that sequence. The recession needs to start at latest 6 quarters after the start of a banking crisis to be considered related to the banking crisis. 11 Two consecutive positive growth quarters mark the end of a recession.
The first of these two quarters is the recovery quarter in which the recession indicator turns 1. The recession period is composed of quarters with negative growth but may include few positive growth quarters within the sequence of negative growth quarters. 12 Such a definition is used as one positive growth quarter does not mean 
Bank recapitalizations
The variable bank recapitalizations measures the cumulative amount of recapitalizations in the banking sector since the start of the crisis. The amounts are weighed by total assets of the banking sector. Recapitalizations are assumed to have an effect on the probability of recovery from the first quarter after they have been implemented until the end of the recession. Some banks repay the capital injections they have received from the state before the recession ends. These banks typically raise equity from private investors to repay the state support. Our variable captures how much state intervention has increased bank capital since the beginning of the crisis.
There is a variety of measures that could be considered a recapitalization. We count as recapitalization injections of common equity, preferred stock, conditionally convertible bonds or any Tier 1 qualifying instrument by the state, a bank restructuring agency or other government agency. We do not consider injections of subordinated debt, qualifying as Tier 2 capital, a recapitalization. Conversion of subordinated debt or other bank liabilities into equity and liability management exercises are counted as recapitalization. Write-offs of bank liabilities in the process of bank restructuring where creditors do not get any security in exchange are not counted as recapitalization although they are sometimes referred to as the contribution of bondholders toward recapitalization. In purchase and assumption deals the state often compensates the acquiring bank for the difference between the value of assets and liabilities of the bank that is being taken over in the process of restructuring. This amount is not counted as recapitalization as it merely brings the net asset value of the restructured bank to zero. It benefits the creditors of the distressed bank that would otherwise suffer losses in the process of restructuring and does not increase capital of the acquirer. If the acquiring bank receives an equity injection on top of that, the equity injection is counted as recapitalization. Sometimes both the state and private 17 investors participate in bank equity issues. In those cases only the amount purchased by the state is counted as recapitalization.
We collect the data about bank recapitalizations from four types of sources: (i) IMF staff reports is our main source; (ii) European Commission decisions about state aid (EU member states need to request approval by the European Commission for measures that could constitute state aid. As a result bank recapitalizations in EU countries in the recent crisis are well described in the documents about state aid decisions.); and (iii) webpages of central banks, restructuring agencies and annual reports of intervened banks.
We need the total amount of recapitalizations in the banking sector in each quarter for all crises.
Whenever possible we collect the recapitalization amounts at bank level. We document the amount of recapitalization, a description of the measure and the month or quarter when the measure was implemented. For the recent crises almost all data has this level of detail. If bank-level data is not available, we collect data about total amount of recapitalizations in each quarter of a recession. For some crises before 2007 IMF staff reports only include how much was spent on recapitalizations until a certain date. In such cases we use two rules how to allocate the amounts across the quarters. If the names of banks or the number of banks intervened in a particular quarter are reported but not the amounts per bank, we assume that each of the intervened bank received an equal amount. If only the date when a bank restructuring program was approved by the government and the total amount of recapitalizations at a later point in time are known, we assume that recapitalization amounts are evenly spread across quarters between the start of the restructuring program and the time at which the cumulative amount of recapitalizations is reported. Table 1 and Table 2 provide data about the amount of bank recapitalizations in banking crises. 13 In some regressions we use an indicator for bank restructuring, which turns from 0 to 1 in the quarter after the following two conditions are satisfied:
-The cumulative recapitalizations since the start of the crisis exceed half of the amount of recapitalizations in the whole banking crisis (which includes recapitalizations after the recession has already ended).
-The cumulative recapitalizations exceed the threshold to be considered significant bank restructuring.
This limit is 0.75% of total banking assets for 2007-2013 crises and 1.75% of total banking assets for 1980-2006 crises. It is 50% of the median total amount of recapitalizations in banking crises where there were some recapitalizations.
The first condition is to determine the time when the main part of bank restructuring has been implemented.
The second is necessary not to treat crises with very little recapitalizations as having done a proper bank restructuring.
Guarantees on bank liabilities
We use an indicator for the presence of significant guarantees on bank liabilities other than deposits. The indicator takes value 1 if guarantees were present in the preceding quarter. The lag is used in order to allow some time for the guarantees to have an effect on GDP growth. We use the data of Laeven and Valencia (2012b) 13 We plan to make the detailed data about bank recapitalizations publicly available. For now the data is available upon request.
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about the introduction and removal dates of significant guarantees on bank liabilities and complement it with data from European Commission decisions about state aid. The indicator for guarantees on bank liabilities in quarter t is equal to 1 if the guarantees were in place in the preceding quarter. The lag is used in order to allow some time for the guarantees to have an effect on GDP growth. The variable values are based on the dates of introduction of blanket guarantees and dates of removal reported in and documents of the European Commission about state aid decisions where the guarantee schemes requested by member states are approved. Appendix 3 reports these dates for the banking crises where extensive guarantees on bank liabilities were used.
Liquidity support
The 
Monetary policy
We use two alternative variables to control for the effect of monetary policy on the probability of recovery. The preferred proxy is the decrease in real interest rates from quarter 
Fiscal policy
We control for the effect of fiscal policy on the probability of recovery by using cyclically adjusted general government deficit in the analysis of crises after 2007. The source of data is World Economic Outlook Database (IMF 2013a). Cyclically adjusted fiscal data is not available for most of crises before 2007. We do not use nonadjusted deficit as it is endogenous to GDP growth. For details see Appendix 4: Data about liquidity support, monetary policy and fiscal policy.
Results
We estimate the effect of bank recapitalizations, guarantees on bank liabilities, liquidity support, monetary policy and fiscal policy on the probability of recovery from recessions related to banking crises. The dependent variable is the recession indicator, having value 0 if a country is in a recession and value 1 if it has just recovered from a recession. The explanatory variables in the regressions are of three types. First, there are the variables representing policies used in banking crises. A positive estimated coefficient means that a higher value of the explanatory variable increases the probability of recovery. Second, there are averages of intervention variables, averaged over all time periods of a recession to control for the correlation between crisis severity and intervention. Third, a linear, quadratic and cubic term of elapsed duration are included to flexibly account for the possibility that the probability of recovery depends on how long a recession has already lasted. RECESSION INDICATOR is the dependent variable having value 1 if a country has just recovered from a recession and 0 if it is in a recession in a particular quarter. A positive regression coefficient means that a higher value of the explanatory variable increases the probability of recovery. BANK RECAPITALIZATIONS are the cumulative amount of recapitalizations since the start of the banking crises, weighted by total banking assets. GUARANTEES ON BANK LIABILITIES are an indicator variable for the presence of guarantees. LIQUIDITY SUPPORT is ratio of central bank claims on other depository corporations divided by the total deposits at other depository corporations. GROWTH OF RESERVE MONEY and REAL INTEREST RATE REDUCTION are measures of monetary policy. CYCLICALLY ADJUSTED FISCAL DEFICIT is a measure of discretionary fiscal policy. All policy variables except for fiscal deficit are lagged one quarter. Averages of dependent variables are included to allow for correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and explanatory variables. DURATION is the number of quarters a recession has already been ongoing until the period for which the probability of recovery is estimated. The specifications are estimated using complementary log-log random effects procedure. In parentheses are z-values of the tests for significance of coefficients. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, ***, respectively. Table 3 recent crises. The samples include crises in which the recession began up to 2 quarters before the start of the banking crisis. The start of the banking crisis is defined as the quarter when major distress in the banking sector was observed. Crises that did not have a recession or crises where the country was already in a recession for more than 2 quarters before the banking crises started, are not included. This cutoff is used to exclude recessions where the problems in the banking system are not an important determinant of the probability of recovery for a large part of recession duration. In Section 7 below, where we check the results for robustness, we present alternative specifications that also include crises with long recessions before the banking crises. This does not affect the results materially.
The estimates of the effect of bank recapitalizations on the probability of recovery are positive and significant in all samples: bank recapitalizations significantly increase the probability of recovery. Guarantees on bank liabilities on the other hand do not have a significant effect, while liquidity support is marginally (at a 10% level) significant only in the full sample; in both subsamples separately it is insignificant. The estimates for growth of reserve money are negative and insignificant. We use growth in reserve money as a proxy of monetary policy in order to be able to perform the analysis on the maximum possible number of crises. However, when we substitute it with the reduction in real interest rates in column (4), the estimated effect is positive and significant, albeit only marginally so, at 10%. The effect of fiscal policy approximated by the cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit is not significant.
Coefficients of averages of bank recapitalizations, guarantees on bank liabilities and real interest rate reduction are statistically significant for at least one sample. This confirms that policies are correlated to unobserved heterogeneity hence including their per crisis average values is necessary to obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients of interest. Time dependence seems to be stronger and more significant in past crises than in recent crises. The coefficient of the linear duration is positive, so the longer a recession has already lasted, the more likely it is to end in the current quarter. The quadratic term is negative, so the marginal effect of duration on exit probability decreases as crises last longer. In other words, recessions that have already lasted some time are likely to be long, so the probability of recovery is decreasing in the square of the duration (the marginal effect decreases linearly in crisis severity). But every recession ends at some point, so the effect of the cubic term is positive. 14 In many crises, recapitalizations are done at multiple times but with the largest amounts typically concentrated in one quarter. To approximate this we rerun the regressions with an alternative definition of bank recapitalization: we replace the continuous recapitalization variable by the bank restructuring indicator which loosely speaking equals one when a significant bank recapitalization took place; for a more precise definition see Section 5. If there were only minor recapitalization the value of bank restructuring indicator is zero. Table 4 reports the results of the regressions of Table 3 but performed with the bank restructuring indicator instead of the continuous bank recapitalization variable.
14 In column (4) of Table 3 , both the quadratic and the cubic term are negative and all three duration terms are insignificant. RECESSION INDICATOR is the dependent variable having value 1 if a country has just recovered from a recession and 0 if it is in a recession in a particular quarter. A positive regression coefficient means that a higher value of the explanatory variable increases the probability of recovery. BANK RESTRUCTURING is an indicator for significant bank recapitalizations.. GUARANTEES ON BANK LIABILITIES are an indicator variable for the presence of guarantees. LIQUIDITY SUPPORT is ratio of central bank claims on other depository corporations divided by the total deposits at other depository corporations. GROWTH OF RESERVE MONEY and REAL INTEREST RATE REDUCTION are measures of monetary policy. CYCLICALLY ADJUSTED FISCAL DEFICIT is a measure of discretionary fiscal policy. All policy variables except for fiscal deficit are lagged one quarter. Averages of dependent variables are included to allow for correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and explanatory variables. DURATION is the number of quarters a recession has already been ongoing until the period for which the probability of recovery is estimated. The specifications are estimated using complementary log-log random effects procedure. In parentheses are z-values of the tests for significance of coefficients. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, ***, respectively.
The basic results are again confirmed: bank recapitalizations are the only intervention that really matters.
Even general liquidity support, as measured by the real interest rate variable, loses significance. Thus we can conclude with confidence that of all intervention policies, bank recapitalizations are the most significant ones. To investigate the size of their effect on recession duration, we compute expected recession durations for two representative crises: a crisis representing the group of crises where substantial recapitalizations were done and a crisis representing the group with no or very little recapitalizations. The reason for introducing two representative crises is that the two groups of crises differ in unobserved crisis severity. Banking crises where 22 banks were recapitalized tended to be much more severe than those where recapitalizations were not done. From here on we use the expression severe representative crisis to denote the representative crisis of the group with significant bank recapitalizations and mild representative crisis to refer to the representative crisis of the group with no bank or minor recapitalizations.
We compute expected recession duration with and without bank restructuring for both representative crises. The expected durations are computed using equations (13), (17) and (18) . The inputs for conditional probabilities of recovery are the estimated coefficients from Table 4 Severe crises are crises where bank restructuring is done at some point. Mild crises are crises where bank restructuring is never done. Average observed duration is the average recession duration of the group of crises to which a representative crisis refers. Expected recession durations are computed based on estimates from Table 4 . The expected durations in each column correspond to estimates in the same column of Table 4 (i.e. the results reported in column (4) of Table 5 are based on the regression reported in column (4) of Table  4 etc.). Expected durations with bank restructuring are computed assuming that bank restructuring is done in the third recession quarter. Table 5 reports the expected durations computed based on estimates from Table 4 . Column (1) of Table   4 refers to column (1) of Table 5 Another way of translating the regression results into an understandable metric is a comparison of exit probabilities over time with and without recapitalizations. Once again we do this for severe and mild crises, as defined earlier. We plot the predicted conditional probabilities, the same that were used to compute expected durations for past crises in column (2) and for the recent crises in column (4) of Table 5 . We present the graphs of subsamples separately because for the 2007-2013 the estimates with real interest rates and fiscal policy are preferable and even without using those measures pooling the two subsamples should not be done according to the likelihood ratio test. We test whether the null-hypothesis that the estimates on the full sample in column (1) of Table 3 (or Table 4 ) are not significantly different from the estimates on the subsamples in columns (2) and (3). The test statistic is
. It has a chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of constraints on coefficients. Pooling the two samples imposes a number of constraints equal to the number of explanatory variables. The P-value of the test with estimates from Table 3 is 0.0122 and with those from Table 4 it is 0.0667. Thus regressions should be run on the two subsamples separately.
In the plots below we show the predicted exit probabilities with and without intervention. Initially, when a recession starts at 0 t  , the predicted probability of recovery is obviously very low, then it gradually increases as time goes by. At some point the curve flattens or even slightly decreases (the 1980-2006 representative crises), but eventually it approaches 1: even without intervention, recessions eventually come to an end. The shape of the curve is due to time dependence, which is captured by the duration terms in regression Finally, we investigate possible interaction effects between bank recapitalizations and other policies on the sample of recent crises. The results are reported in Table 6 . When interactions terms are included individually, the interaction of guarantees on bank liabilities with bank recapitalizations and fiscal policy with bank recapitalizations are negative and significant. However, when all interaction terms are included simultaneously, their signs do not change but significance levels are much reduced, in fact no interaction term is significant in column (6) of Table 6 . In all variants the basic impact of bank recapitalizations remains highly significant. The significance level of real interest rate reduction increases compared to the baseline regression.
Guarantees on bank liabilities were used in all but one crisis after 2007. They were almost always already in place when bank recapitalizations were done. The negative interaction coefficient suggests that guarantees have a more positive (although still insignificant) effect in the first phase of the crisis before bank recapitalizations are done but that their effect goes down once recapitalizations are implemented. Another way of interpreting the results is that providing guarantees have no positive impact in itself (its coefficient is insignificant) but that they undermine the impact of bank recaps: witness the negative interaction term.
The negative interaction term with fiscal policy is consistent with the predictions of Van der Kwaak and Van Wijnbergen (2013) , who argue that fiscal stimuli in a weak bank capitalization environment are less effective RECESSION INDICATOR is the dependent variable having value 1 if a country has just recovered from a recession and 0 if it is in a recession in a particular quarter. A positive regression coefficient means that a higher value of the explanatory variable increases the probability of recovery. BANK RECAPITALIZATIONS are the cumulative amount of recapitalizations since the start of the banking crises, weighted by total banking assets. GUARANTEES ON BANK LIABILITIES are an indicator variable for the presence of guarantees. LIQUIDITY SUPPORT is ratio of central bank claims on other depository corporations divided by the total deposits at other depository corporations. GROWTH OF RESERVE MONEY and REAL INTEREST RATE REDUCTION are measures of monetary policy. CYCLICALLY ADJUSTED FISCAL DEFICIT is a measure of discretionary fiscal policy. All policy variables except for fiscal deficit are lagged one quarter. Averages of dependent variables are included to allow for correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and explanatory variables. DURATION is the number of quarters a recession has already been ongoing until the period for which the probability of recovery is estimated. The specifications are estimated using complementary log-log random effects procedure. In parentheses are z-values of the tests for significance of coefficients. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, ***, respectively.
Robustness checks
In this section we perform several additional regressions to check the robustness of our results. Firstly, we include the squared term of bank recapitalizations into the regression specification to check whether each 27 additional amount of recapitalizations is equally beneficial. We find an insignificant positive effect of the squared term on the sample of past crises and a negative effect on the sample of recent crisis. insignificant. In column (3) also the second Greek recession is included, which does not make any difference compared to column (2). In column (4) we use forecast data for the second Greek recession (and do not include Cyprus). The forecasts from the World Economic Outlook database (IMF 2013a) predict that Greece will recover in 2014 Q1. In addition to that we assume that the values of policy variables will be the same in 2013 Q4
and 2014 Q1 as in 2013 Q3. 16 The estimation results in columns (2), (3) and (4) To check whether our results are robust with respect to the definition of recession duration we perform estimations on data where (A) a more lax and (B) a more strict rule is used to determine which quarters constitute a recession. Under the lax definition we do not require a recession to include two consecutive negative growth quarters. A sequence of a negative, a positive and a negative quarter is considered a 3-quarter recession.
Under this definition also Bolivia experienced a recession. In addition to this change we include also recessions that started more than 2 quarters before the start of the banking crises. As these recessions were not related to a banking crisis when they started we only count 4 quarters before the start of the banking crisis and the quarters after the start of the banking crisis as their recession duration. This adds 2 more recessions to the sample. 17
Under the strict definition we only count consecutive negative quarters as recession and do not include recessions that started more than 2 quarter before the banking crisis. Compared to the main definition some recessions are shorter under this definition. They either start later or end sooner. 15 Compared to recapitalizations in 1980-2006 crises it is not that high. See Table 1 and Table 2 for details. 16 Our data about policy variables runs until 2013 Q2 but because the values of policy variables are lagged in regression we in fact can use actual data until 2013 Q3 and only need to use assumptions for two quarters. Table 13 in the Appendix provides the estimation results with both recession definitions. The estimates in columns (1) and (4) on the full sample can be compared with column (1) of Table 3 , columns (2) and (4) on the sample of past crises with column (2) of Table 3 , and columns (3) and (6) on the sample of recent crises with column (4) in Table 3 . The estimation results under both alternative definitions are very similar to the main results. The effect of bank recapitalizations and reduction in real interest rate are positive and significant. The estimated effect of liquidity support is positive under the lax definition of recession for the sample of past crises while it was insignificant in the main results and the negative effect of guarantees becomes significant under the strict recession definition on the past crises sample. Otherwise there are no important differences.
In the final robustness check we run the regression using different distribution functions for the duration model. Instead of complementary log-log random effects estimation we use (A) logit random effect estimation and (B) linear probability model with random effects in Table 14 in the Appendix. The estimates obtained with logit are very similar to our main results in Table 3 . In the linear probability model the predicted probabilities can lie outside of the   0,1 range but even then the effect of bank recapitalizations remains.
Conclusions
We show that bank restructuring measures that provide banks with incentives to liquidate or restructure bad loans, significantly accelerate the recovery from recessions related to banking crises. In contrast, guarantees on bank liabilities and liquidity support only prevent bank failures. They enable zombie banks to hold on to bad loans, gambling that those loans will repay with some small probability. Sticking to bad loans is apparently a value-destroying decision; bank shareholders opt for it because they can shift risk on debtholders or the government. Ultimately such behavior of banks leads to lower aggregate output.
We analyze the effect of intervention measures on the duration of recessions after 68 systemic banking crises in the period 1980-2013. We estimate a duration model with recession specific fixed effects on a panel dataset. Our approach takes into account that intervention in banking crises is endogenous to crisis severity. We use the fact that the average use of intervention over the crisis period is informative about crisis severity. The estimations confirm that controlling for crisis severity is crucial. We find a positive and highly significant effect of bank recapitalizations on the probability of recovery. The other policies directed at distressed banks, guarantees on bank liabilities and liquidity support, do not seem to contribute much to a faster recovery.
Our approach enables us to compute expected durations at different values of intervention variables while keeping crisis severity constant. Our empirical results very clearly show that bank recapitalizations substantially reduce expected recession duration. On first sight, crises where bank recapitalizations were done and those where they were not, look similar; on average both types of crises lasted about 5 quarters. But the difference in their severity and the scale of the effect of bank recapitalizations becomes obvious when we compute the counterfactual expected durations. A typical crisis where banks were not recapitalized would last only 3 quarters if recapitalizations would be carried out while the recession of a typical crisis where banks were recapitalized would be about twice as long if bank recapitalizations had not been done.
In the theoretical part of our paper, we model the mechanism that explains the differential impact of bank recapitalization on bank incentives vs. all other interventions. A well-capitalized bank has an incentive to maximize the expected total payoff of a bad loan. A weakly capitalized bank, however, prefers to gamble on the highly unlikely repayment of the bad loan even though this is a negative NPV project. In stable times banks hold just enough capital to commit to take the right decision about bad loans else they could not raise debt. In a systemic banking crisis banks realize an unexpectedly high proportion of bad loans, which means their capital is no longer sufficient to incentivize them to optimally manage their portfolio. In such circumstances the regulator intervenes to prevent two types of inefficiencies: liquidation of good loans below their true value (triggered when depositors refuse to roll over) and continuation of bad loans, which destroys value. We show that timely and sufficient bank recapitalizations achieve both goals, while other types of intervention achieve only the first.
Thus we show that from a macroeconomic point of view, bank recapitalizations are the best intervention. Bank recapitalization leads to substantially shorter periods of output loss than other ways of supporting banks in distress. Obviously, our findings argue in favor of higher capital requirements: holding more capital in stable times would reduce the need for intervention in bad times. Recapitalizations would not be necessary for sufficiently low values of the shock. We leave questions about the interaction between ex ante incentives of intervention and maximization of ex post welfare for future research. It is equally tempting to speculate on the impact of our findings on the debate about the macroeconomic impact of stricter capital requirements. However it is likely that the manner in which capital requirements are met plays a role in that discussion; another topic for future research. FOST (Transferable deposits included in broad money) and FOSD (Other deposits included in broad money).
For time periods for which these items are not available, we use items: 12e_ (Claims on other depository corporations), 24_ (Demand deposits) and 25_ (Time, savings and foreign currency deposits).
For the United Kingdom these data is not available in the IFS therefore we use the data from the Bank of England ( reported to be 0 from 1995 Q2 to 2010 Q3. This suggests that there was no liquidity support in the crisis that started in 1996. Laeven and Valencia (2012a) , however, report that the peak value of liquidity support in that crisis was 0.37%. Since 0.37% is very low, we use it as the value of liquidity support measure for Jamaica for the entire recession period. For the Swedish crisis in 1991 the data about total deposits is not available after the last quarter of 1989 while the data about the claims of the central bank on other depository corporations is available.
We use the value of deposits in 1989 Q4 as the denominator to compute the liquidity support ratio over the entire crisis period. The numerator changes every quarter. If the amount of deposits is reasonably stable using such an approximation is better than dropping the Swedish crisis from the sample.
Monetary policy
For monetary policy we use two alternative measures: growth of reserve money and decrease in real interest rate. where r is the real interest rate, i the nominal rate and  the expected inflation rate. As the nominal interest rate we use several IFS items describing interest rates relevant for monetary policy: FIMM (Interest rates, money market rate), FPOLM (Interest rates, monetary policy related interest rate), FID (Interest rates, discount rate).
The first of these that is non-missing is used as the nominal rate in a crisis. For all but two recessions after 2007 FIMM is used. In case of Eurozone countries sometimes country-specific FIMM is reported. If the country specific FIMM is not available, we use the FIMM of the Euro Area, which is also reported in the IFS. Inflation rates are always country-specific. Therefore the real interest rates differ across Eurozone members even if the nominal interest rate is the same. As the expected inflation rate we use PCPI (Consumer prices, all items) percent change over the corresponding quarter of the previous year. We only compute real interest rates if the relevant annual inflation rate is less than 50%.
Fiscal policy
As a measure of fiscal policy we use cyclically adjusted deficit of general government obtained from the item GGCB (General government cyclically adjusted primary balance, percent of potential in fiscal year GDP) from the WEO (IMF 2013a) 19 . Table 10 and Table 11 report the average values of liquidity support, reserve money growth, decrease in real interest rate and cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit for all recessions. The data sources used to construct variable values are reported for each crisis for variables where different sources or items are possible.
